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plantings and the scope of crop insurance coverage.  In that case,
the plaintiff was a dryland wheat farmer in New Mexico in a
region that had suffered drought conditions for several years.
The plaintiff did not plant a wheat crop after determining that the
moisture level was too low and would not support a crop.  The
plantiff's neighbors  did plant a crop of wheat and their crop
failed to mature resulting in severe wind erosion to their land.
The plaintiff applied for crop insurance benefits on the basis that
the drought prevented the plaintiff from planting a wheat crop.
Coverage under the plaintiff's policy was provided for "prevented
plantings," which was defined in part as the inability "to plant the
insured crop due to an insured cause of loss that is general in the
area (i.e., most producers in the surrounding area are unable to
plant due to similar insurable causes)."13
The local Farm Service Agency denied the plaintiff's claim and
the plaintiff appealed to the National Appeals Division (NAD) of
the United States Department of Agriculture.  The NAD hearing
officer denied the claim, holding that the plaintiff's neighbors
were able to and did plant wheat so the criteria were not met for
"prevented plantings."  On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the
plaintiff argued that the "prevented planting" provision in the
policy was unreasonable because it required the plaintiff to
violate sound conservation practices to be eligible to recover
under the policy.  The court upheld the administrative findings on
the basis that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that the
insurance program's general reliance on what other farmers do as
a measure for determining whether planting is "prevented" was
unreasonable or not in accordance with governing law. 14
Involuntary conversion?
A further question is whether the proceeds from prevented
plantings are eligible for involuntary conversion treatment15
inasmuch as the language of the statute states that payments
received because of inability to plant crops are to be treated as
insurance proceeds received as a result of "destruction or damage
to crops."16 If the requirements for involuntary conversion
treatment are met, the proceeds can be invested in other property
"similar or related in service or use to the property so
converted…." within two years after the close of the taxable year
in which any part of the gain is realized.17
In a 1959 ruling, a farmer collected insurance on hail damage to
a wheat crop.18  IRS said it was an involuntary conversion and
gain could be avoided by investing the insurance proceeds in
another crop of standing wheat or a harvested crop.19  The ruling
points out, however, that use of the insurance proceeds to cover
the costs of planting a new crop is not the acquisition of eligible
replacement property. 20
Thus far, there is no authority confirming that prevented
planting payments can be invested in eligible replacement
property as an involuntary conversion with avoidance of
recognition of gain.
In conclusion
The statutory language specifying that prevented planting
ayments are to be treated as crop insurance proceeds for the
destruc ion or damage to crops seems broad enough to allow
involuntary conversion treatment.  However, until specific
authority becomes available allowing such treatment, some
question will exist over such reinvestment.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS . The debtors had leased farm land from
five different landlords. Three of the leases were written and
included language that the rent was subject to a landlord’s lien
“as provided by law.” A fourth lease was written but contained no
language concerning a landlord’s lien. The fifth lease was an oral
lease and neither party alleged that there was any provision for a
landlord’s lien for the rent. The debtors sought to avoid, under
Section 545, all of the liens as statutory liens. The first three
landlords argued that, because the liens were mentioned in the
leases, the liens were nonavoidable consensual liens. The court
held that the first three leases did not create separate liens but
merely restated the landlords’ statutory lien rights. In addition,
the court held that, even if separate liens were created, the
landlords failed to perfect the liens under the UCC. The court also
allowed avoidance of the statutory landlord’s lien in the other two
leases. In re Marshall 238 B.R. 193 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999).
PLAN . The debtor was a farm partnership with two partners.
Each partner had filed for personal bankruptcy and listed the
partnership debts in the cases. The partners each received
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discharges. The partnership then filed for Chapter 11 and the plan
provided for reorganization of the partnership as a corporation
and transfer of all partnership obligations to the corporation such
that if the plan payments were not made, only the corporation
would be liable for the partnership’s debts. A secured creditor
objected to the plan because it removed the partners’ personal
liability for partnership debts. The court held that the plan could
not be confirmed over the secured creditor’s objection because
the plan would remove the partners’ personal liability for the
secured claim. In re E-H Farms, 238 B.R. 661 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1999).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
CONVERSION. The debtors were farmers who originally filed
under Chapter 12. In previous rulings in their case, the debtors
were found to have made fraudulent transfers of property during
their case and the case was converted to Chapter 7. Although the
issues had been litigated in early decisions and appeals, the
debtors again argued that their case could not be converted to
Chapter 7 involuntarily because an involuntary case could not be
filed against a family farmer. The court reiterated its prior rulings
that the debtors had made fraudulent transfers and that a Chapter
12 case could be involuntarily converted to Chapter 7. In re
Graven, 186 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 1999), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec.
aff’g, 196 B.R. 506 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1996). See also In re
Graven, 138 B.R. 587 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992), aff'd by unrep.
D. Ct. dec., aff'd, 64 F.3d 453 (8th Cir. 1995).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS . The IRS filed a claim for priority taxes more than
three and one-half years after the bar date and sought a ruling that
the taxes were still entitled to priority status. The IRS motion was
filed before any plan distributions were made. If the IRS claim
was allowed priority status, the unsecured creditors would not
receive any distributions. The court held that there was no
statutory authority to deprive the tax claim of priority status
merely because the claim was untimely filed. In addition, the
court refused to subordinate the tax claim because of equitable
concerns because the trustee failed to show that the unsecured
creditors were otherwise disadvantaged by the IRS delay in filing
the claim. In re Johnson Rehab. Nursing Home, Inc., 239 B.R.
168 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1999).
POST-PETITION INTEREST . The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan
provided for full payment of an unsecured priority tax claim but
did not provide for payment of any post-petition interest on the
claim. The debtor made all payments under the plan and received
a discharge. The IRS sought collection of post-petition interest on
the claim and the debtor. The debtor argued that the IRS was
bound by the res judicata effect of the bankruptcy plan and
discharge. The court cited In re Bossert, 201 B.R. 553 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1996) and In re Mitchell, 210 B.R. 978 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1997, aff’d, unrep. D. Ct. dec. (N.D. Tex. 1997) in holding
that the IRS was not entitled to post-petition interest. In re
Cousins, 238 B.R. 503 (D. N.H. 1999), aff’g 236 B.R. 119
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BRUCELLOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final regulations
amending the brucellosis regulations concerning the interstate
mov ment of cattle by changing the classification of Kansas from
Class A to Class Free. 64 Fed. Reg. 67695 (Dec. 3, 1999).
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiffs were farmers who applied
for and received crop revenue insurance for durum wheat. The
FCIC issued a policy which contained a coverage payment
provision which was later amended because of a drop in wheat
prices which substantially increased the payments which would
be received by insureds who had covered losses. The plaintiffs
argued that the retroactive amendment of the insurance policy
was void as arbitrary and capricious administrative action. The
court held that the action was arbitrary and capricious as violating
the purposes of the crop insurance provisions which sought to
establish a secure and reliable system of insurance. The court
ordered the reinstatement of the original policy provisions and
enjoined enforcement of the amended policy. The USDA has
filed an appeal. Wiley v. Glickman, No. A3-99-32 (D. N.D.
1999).
The FCIC Board of Directors has announced that it has
approved for reinsurance and subsidy the insurance of corn, grain
sorghum, soybeans, cotton, and rice in select states and counties
under the Crop Revenue Coverage  plan of insurance for the 2000
crop year. 64 Fed. Reg. 66839 (Nov. 20, 1999).
ELEVATORS . The CCC) is soliciting public comment on the
erits of whether the CCC should finance, in some manner, the
install tion or upgrading of grain cleaning systems at wheat
export elevators in the United States. The goal of this initiative
would be to improve the quality and competitiveness of U.S.
wheat exports by insuring that foreign buyers may readily
purchase U.S. wheat with dockage specifications substantially
lower than currently available from export elevators. 64 Fed.
Reg. 66606 (Nov. 28, 1999).
PEANUTS. The FSA has announced a proposed national
peanut poundage quota figure for 2000 in the range between
1,170,000 and 1,190,000 short tons. 64 Fed. Reg. 66790 (Nov.
30, 1999).
SCRAPIE . The APHIS has issued proposed regulations which
rict  interstate movement of sheep and goats from states
that do not follow effective flock management practices for
scrapie. The amendments also require animal identification for
sheep and goats moving interstate and reinstate a scrapie
indemnity program to compensate owners of certain animals
destroyed due to scrapie. 64 Fed. Reg. 66791 (Nov. 30, 1999).
STAN ARDS. The AMS has issued a notice of revisions to the
United States Standards for Grades of Oranges, Grapefruit,
Tangerines and Lemons. The changes will provide a minimum
25-count sample to be applied to tolerances for defects, revise the
grades to make them uniform and consistent with each other and
other recently revised U.S. grade standards, and, delete references
to outdated industry practices and terminology. 64 Fed. Reg.
66162 (Nov. 24, 1999).
TOBACCO . The CCC has adopted as final regulations setting
the 1999 marketing quota for flue-cured tobacco at 666.2 million
pounds and the 1999 price support level at 163.2 cents per pound.
64 Fed. Reg. 66717 (Nov. 30, 1999).
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FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES . In response to the holding
in Estate of Hubert v. Comm’r, 520 U.S. 93 (1997), see 8 Agric.
L. Dig. 52 (1997), the IRS has adopted as final regulations
providing that only administration expenses of a certain character
which are charged to the marital property bequest will reduce the
value of the property for marital deduction purposes. The rules
also apply for purposes of the estate tax charitable deduction.
Under the regulations, a reduction is made to the date of death
value of the property interest which passes from the decedent to
the surviving spouse (or to a charitable organization described in
I.R.C. § 2055) for the dollar amount of any estate transmission
expenses incurred during the administration of the decedent's
estate and charged to the property interest. Such a reduction is
proper because these expenses would not have been incurred but
for the decedent's death. No reduction is made for estate
management expenses incurred with respect to the property and
charged to the property because these expenses would have been
incurred even if the death had not occurred. However, a reduction
is made for estate management expenses charged to the marital
property interest passing to the surviving spouse if the expenses
were incurred in connection with property passing to someone
other than the surviving spouse and a person other than the
surviving spouse is entitled to the income from that property.
Estate transmission expenses are all estate administration
expenses that are not estate management expenses and include
expenses incurred in collecting estate assets, paying debts, estate
and inheritance taxes, and distributing the decedent's property.
Estate management expenses are expenses incurred in connection
with the investment of the estate assets and with their
preservation and maintenance during the period of administration.
64 Fed. Reg. 67763 (Dec. 3, 1999).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS . The trustee and
beneficiaries of a trust established prior to 1985 petitioned a state
court to amend the trust provisions for appointing trustees. The
state court allowed the modifications. The IRS ruled that the
modifications did not subject the trust to GSTT. Ltr. Rul.
9946021, Aug. 23, 1999; Ltr. Rul. 9946030, Aug. 18, 1999; Ltr.
Rul. 9946031, Aug. 18, 1999; Ltr. Rul. 9946032, Aug. 18, 1999.
VALUATION . The IRS has adopted as final regulations
governing the limitation period for assessment of tax on gifts for
gift and estate tax purposes. For gifts after August 5, 1997, I.R.C.
§ 6501(c)(9) extends the period of assessment indefinitely unless
the gifts were disclosed on the gift tax return in a manner
adequate to apprise the IRS of the nature of the transfer. The
regulations identify the information which must be disclosed
before the limitation period will begin to run. The required
information must completely and accurately describe the
transaction and include: the nature of the transferred property; the
parties involved; the value of the transferred property; and how
the value was determined, including any discounts or adjustments
used in valuing the transferred property. In addition, the return
must disclose the facts affecting the gift tax treatment of the
transaction in a manner that reasonably may be expected to
apprise the IRS of the nature of any potential controversy
regarding the gift tax treatment of the transfer. Treas. Reg. §
20.2001-1.
Under I.R.C. § 2504(c) as amended in 1997 and 1998, if a gift
was adequately disclosed such that the time has expired for
assessing gift tax for a preceding calendar period under I.R.C. §
6501, then the value of such gift made in the prior calendar period
cannot be adjusted (regardless of whether or not a gift tax has
been assessed or paid for a prior calendar period). Rather, the
value of the gift is the value as finally determined for gift tax
purposes, as defined in I.R.C. § 2001(f). A similar rule applies
with respect to any increase in taxable gifts required under I.R.C.
§ 2701(d). I.R.C. § 2504(c) applies only to adjustments involving
issues of valuation. Thus, even after the 1997 and 1998
amendments to I.R.C. § 2504(c), adjustments to prior taxable
gifts may be made if the adjustment is not related to the valuation
of the gift; e.g., the erroneous inclusion or exclusion of property
for gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 25.2504-2.
Under I.R.C. § 2001(f), if the time has expired for assessing gift
tax for a preceding calendar period under I.R.C. § 6501, then the
value of a gift, for purposes of computing the estate tax liability,
is the value of the gift as finally determined for gift tax purposes.
A similar rule applies for any increase in taxable gifts required
under I.R.C. § 2701(d). Under the statute, the value of a gift is
finally determined if: the value is shown on a gift tax return and
the IRS does not contest the value before the period for assessing
gift tax expires; or, before the period for assessing gift tax
expires, the value is specified by the IRS and the taxpayer does
not contest the specified value; or, the value is determined by a
court or pursuant to a settlement agreement between the taxpayer
and the IRS. Again, the provision only limits the IRS' ability to
make adjustments related to the value of a gift. Thus, the IRS is
not precluded from making adjustments that are not related to
value, such as the erroneous inclusion or exclusion of property for
gift tax purposes. Treas. Reg. § 301.6501(c)-1.  64 Fed. Reg.
67767 (Dec. 3, 1999).
The shareholders of a corporation exchanged all of their stock
for stock in an LLC in a transaction intended to qualify as a tax-
free reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F). The LLC was
authorized to issue membership units with rights, preferences, and
restrictions identical to the classes of stock exchanged. After the
corporation was merged into the LLC, the shareholders
exchanged their shares in the corporation for an identical number
of units in the LLC with rights, preferences, and restrictions
identical to the rights, preferences, and restrictions each
shareholder held in the corporation before the transfer. The IRS
ruled that the exchange was not subject to I.R.C. § 2701 valuation
rules because the shareholders’ interests in the LLC were
identical to their interest in the corporation. Lt . Rul. 9947034,
Aug. 26, 1999.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COOPERATIVES . The taxpayer was a nonexempt agricultural
cooperative which owned directly or through stock ownership oil
and gas refinery businesses which provided petroleum products to
the memb rs of the taxpayer. The taxpayer sold the stock and
properties when the businesses became nonprofitable and the
issue was whether the proceeds of the sales were patronage-
sourced income. The court held that the proceeds were patronage-
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sourced income because the property was directly related to the
taxpayer’s business with its members. The court rejected the IRS
argument that all capital gain was nonpatronage-sourced income.
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-388.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife, operated
an activity that included the breeding, care, showing, and
occasional sale of cutting horses used in competitions. The
husband was employed full time in another business and the wife
devoted at least six hours a day to the horse activity. The horse
activity never had a taxable profit. The court held that the
taxpayers did not operate the horse activity with the intent to
make a profit, based on the following findings: (1) although the
taxpayers maintained accurate and separate records of the
activity, the taxpayers did not use the records to evaluate the
profitability of the activity; (2) the taxpayers did not create a plan
for profitability other than to try to economize in purchases; (3)
although the wife developed expertise in the riding and breeding
of horses, the taxpayers did not have or acquire expertise in
operating a business involving horses; (4) the wife devoted
substantial time to the activity but much of the time had an
element of personal enjoyment and recreation; (5) the taxpayers
failed to demonstrate that any of the horses would appreciate
sufficiently to offset the years of losses; (6) the activity had 23
years of losses; and the taxpayers had substantial income from the
husband’s employment which was offset by the horse activity
losses. The appellate court affirmed in an opinion designated as
not for publication. Sullivan v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,987 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-367.
INTEREST ON TAXES . The IRS has announced a change in
the IRS's litigating position with respect to when interest begins
to accrue on a deficiency in tax if, pursuant to the taxpayer's
election, the IRS credited the reported overpayment against the
taxpayer's estimated tax liability for the succeeding taxable year.
This issue was litigated in The May Department Stores Co. v.
United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 680 (1996), acq., AOD CC-1997-008
(Aug. 4, 1997). In subsequent guidance, Rev. Rul. 99-40, I.R.B.
1999-40 441, the IRS stated that, when the taxpayer files its
return on or before the due date or the due date as extended and
elects to credit its reported overpayment against its estimated tax
for the succeeding year, the overpayment is considered as applied
to the unpaid installments of estimated tax due on or after the
date(s) the overpayment arose in the order in which they are
required to be paid to avoid an addition to tax for failure to pay
estimated income tax under I.R.C. §§ 6654, 6655 with respect to
such year. The IRS, therefore, will no longer litigate cases where
the taxpayer elected to credit its reported overpayment to its
estimated tax for the succeeding year and interest was assessed on
a deficiency, or portion thereof, that is equal to or less than the
claimed overpayment before the claimed overpayment, or a
portion thereof, was needed to avoid an addition to tax for failure
to pay estimated tax, or to the extent that a portion of the
overpayment was not needed to satisfy the specific installments
of estimated tax, from the original due date of the succeeding
year's income tax return. Chief Counsel Notice N(35)000-165.
INTEREST RATE .  The IRS has announced that, for the
period January 1, 2000 through March 31, 2000, the interest rate
paid on tax overpayments is 8 percent (7 percent in the case of a
corporation) and for underpayments is 8 percent. The interest rate
for underpayments by large corporations is 10 percent. The
overpayment rate for the portion of a corporate overpayment
exceeding $10,000 is 5.5 percent. Rev. Rul. 99-53, I.R.B. 1999-
__.
PREPRODUCTIVE PERIOD EXPENSES . The taxpayers
purchased farm land in the first tax year and planted one-year old
grape vines in the third tax year. The taxpayers did not claim any
farming expenses as business deductions and did not file
Schedule Fs for the first three years. The vines produced a
suffici nt quantity of grapes for sale in tax year four but the
quantity was reduced by deer damage and was only 3.3 percent of
mature vines. The fifth year crop was larger but was reduced by
bird damage and was only 3.9 percent of a mature vine crop. The
sixth year crop was larger still but suffered losses from mildew
and was 39 percent of a mature vine crop. The seventh crop was
unusually bountiful. The taxpayers were on the cash accounting
me hod. The IRS ruled that the nationwide weighted average
preproductive period for wine grapes was four years; therefore,
the taxpayer was not eligible for the exemption from capitalizing
preproductive costs. The IRS stated that the taxpayer had to
capitalize preproductive costs until the vines produced a
arketable quantity, which the IRS defined as a quantity which
could be sold for an amount sufficient to recover production costs
plus more than a de minimis recovery of investment costs. The
IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s vines did not produce a marketable
quantity until the sixth year. The IRS disavowed its own Market
S gment Specialization Program Paper for the Wine Industry
which efined a “commercially harvestable crop” merely as a
crop sufficient to recover the costs of production. The IRS also
ruled that the preproductive expense capitalization period ended
at the harvest of the first marketable crop in the sixth crop year,
not at the beginning of the sixth crop year. Finally, the IRS ruled
that, because the taxpayer planted the vines in the third tax year
and i curred preproduction expenses in that year but did not make
n explicit election to not capitalize preproduction expenses nor
an implicit election by deducting the expenses currently, the
taxpayer did not make an election to currently deduct
preproduction expenses. Thus, the taxpayer was required to
capitalize all preproduction expenses up to the time of the sixth
crop harvest. L r. Rul. 9946003, Aug. 6, 1999.
QUALIFIED DEBT INSTRUMENTS .  The IRS has
announced the 2000 inflation adjusted amounts of debt
instruments which qualify for the 9 percent discount rate
limitation under I.R.C. §§ 483 and 1274:
Year of Sale 1274A(b) 1274A(c)(2)(A)
or Exchange Amount Amount
2000 $3,960,100 $2,828,700
The $3,960,100 figure is the dividing line for 1999 below which
(in terms of seller financing) the minimum interest rate is the
lesser of 9 percent or the Applicable Federal Rate. Where the
amount of seller financing exceeds the  $3,960,100 figure, the
imputed rate is 100 percent of the AFR except in cases of sale-
leaseback transactions, where the imputed rate is 110 percent of
AFR. If the amount of seller financing is $2,828,700 or less (for
2000), both parties may elect to account for the interest under the
cash method of accounting.  Rev. Rul. 99-50, I.R.B. 1999-_, __.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in November 1999,
the weighted average is 5.99 percent with the permissible range
of 5.39 to 6.29 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and
5.39 to 6.59 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 99-54, I.R.B. 1999-__.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced plans to test a new internet
system for handling taxpayer account questions. The initial test
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will involve only selected, established electronic return filers who
are members of the National Association of Enrolled Agents. IR-
1999-95.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations defining “last known
address” in relation to the mailing of notices of deficiency and
other notices, statements, and documents sent to a taxpayer's last
known address. The proposed regulations affect taxpayers who
receive notices of deficiency and other notices, statements, and
documents sent to taxpayers' last known addresses. 64 Fed. Reg.
63768 (Nov. 22, 1999).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
December 1999
AnnualSemi-annual Quarterly   Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.74 5.66 5.62 5.59
110 percent AFR 6.33 6.23 6.18 6.15
120 percent AFR 6.91 6.79 6.73 6.70
Mid-term
AFR 6.20 6.11 6.06 6.03
110 percent AFR 6.83 6.72 6.66 6.63
120 percent AFR 7.46 7.33 7.26 7.22
Long-term
AFR 6.47 6.37 6.32 6.29
110 percent AFR 7.13 7.01 6.95 6.91
120 percent AFR 7.79 7.64 7.57 7.52
Rev. Rul. 99-48, I.R.B. 1999-__.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. The IRS has adopted as final regulations
describing how elective changes in an entity's classification will
be treated for federal tax purposes. Under the regulations, there
are four possible changes in classification by election: (i) a
partnership elects to be an association; (ii) an association elects to
be a partnership; (iii) an association elects to be a disregarded
entity; and (iv) a disregarded entity elects to be an association.
The regulations provide a specific characterization for each of
the four possible elective changes. In each case, the
characterization provided in the regulations attempts to minimize
the tax consequences of the change in classification and achieve
administrative simplicity. The regulations provide that if an
association elects to be classified as a partnership, the association
is deemed to liquidate by distributing its assets and liabilities to
its shareholders. Then, the shareholders are deemed to contribute
all of the distributed assets and liabilities to the partnership. See
also Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 71.
    If a partnership elects to be classified as an association, the
partnership is deemed to contribute all of its assets and liabilities
to the association in exchange for stock in the association. Then,
the partnership is deemed to liquidate by distributing stock in the
association to its partners. The regulations do not affect the
holdings in Rev. Rul. 84-111, 1984-2 C.B. 88, in which the IRS
ruled that it would respect the particular form undertaken by the
taxpayers when a partnership converts to a corporation.
    If an association elects to be disregarded as an entity separate
from its wner, the association is deemed to liquidate by
distributing its assets and liabilities to its sole owner. Conversely,
if an eligible entity that is disregarded as an entity separate from
its owner elects to be classified as an association, the owner of the
eligible entity is deemed to contribute all of the assets and
liabilities of that entity to the association in exchange for stock of
the association.
The regulations also provide that the tax treatment of an elective
change in classification is determined under all relevant
provisions of the I.R.C. and general principles of tax law,
including the step transaction doctrine. This provision is intended
to ensure that the tax consequences of an elective change will be
identical to the consequences that would have occurred if the
taxpayer had actually taken the steps described in the regulations.
64 Fed. Reg. 66580 (Nov. 29, 1999).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a medical doctor and formed a
trust with the taxpayer as beneficiary. The taxpayer transferred
the taxpayer’s residence and assigned income to the trust which
allowed the taxpayer to reside in the residence and paid the
taxpayer for the taxpayer’s services. The court held that the trust
was a sham because it lacked any economic substance in that the
taxpayer performed all the services that produced trust income
and treat d the trust property as the taxpayer’s own. G orge v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-381.
 The taxpayers had owned and operated a family farm for more
than 46 years when they transferred business and personal assets
to  trust. The trustees were corporations formed by promoters of
the trust scheme as a method of reducing the taxpayers’ taxes.
Th  court held that the trusts were sham entities created solely for
ax evasion because the control over the farm and personal assets
income remained with the taxpayers. Zachman v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1999-391; Zachman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1999-392.
CITATION UPDATES
In re Orr, 239 B.R. 130 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d 180 F.3d 656
(5th Cir. 1999) (tax liens) see p. 168 supra.
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